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Abstract 
Collateral constitutes an indispensable lubricant for the financial 
system. Government bonds constitute the most important 
source of collateral, for use in inter-bank and repo transactions. 
But, the vast bond buying program of the ECB in the context of 
the Public Sector Purchase Programme has not led to any 
collateral scarcity. Banks still hold very large amounts of 
sovereign bonds and they have ample other collateral should 
they want to borrow more from the ECB for ‘standard’ monetary 
policy operations. Banks tend to use less liquid assets as 
collateral with the ECB, but this does not mean necessarily more 
risk for the ECB for which liquidity is not important. 
This document was provided by Policy Department A at the 
request of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Collateral is a key ‘lubricant’ for financial markets. In many transactions, the parties use collateral to 
reduce their risk in case the counterparty cannot perform its obligation. In the euro area, one must 
distinguish between two different aspects. 
• Banks need high quality collateral if they want to borrow from the Eurosystem in the context of its 
standard lending operations.  
• Many inter-bank and other financial transactions, such as repo operations and derivative 
transactions, involve the posting of collateral. 
Government bonds constitute the most important collateral, for use in inter-bank and repo 
transactions. The vast bond-buying program of the Eurosystem within the context of the Asset 
Purchase Programmes (APP) has reduced especially the amount of government bonds available on the 
market.  But the ECB has bought less than one third of all government bonds outstanding. This implies 
that there is little reason to think that the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) has led to a 
generalized collateral scarcity.  
What matters for monetary policy are the assets banks hold on their balance sheet which are accepted 
as collateral by the ECB (so-called eligible assets). There is no sign that the PSPP has led to a reduction 
in the eligible assets held by the banking system.  In particular banks still hold almost the same amount 
of sovereign bonds as four years ago, i.e. before the start of the PSPP.  Moreover, banks have ample 
other collateral should they want to borrow from the Eurosystem for standard monetary policy 
operations. 
There is little sign of a lowering of the credit quality of the assets effectively used as collateral by the 
ECB, but banks tend to prefer less liquid assets as collateral in their operations with the Eurosystem. 
Given that the Eurosystem does not need liquidity this should not be of great concern.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
After the great financial crisis central banks first reduced their policy rates to zero.  When this was not 
enough to offset the weakness of the economy they turned to non-standard monetary policy measures 
with the aim to increase inflation with an expansion of the balance sheet. The Eurosystem followed a 
similar path embarking in early 2015 on its Asset Purchase Programme (APP), including the Public 
Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) and the Corporate Sector Purchase Programme (CSPP). The 
Eurosystem had already started to buy securities much earlier, but these purchases were either linked 
to specific episodes of financial market tensions (SMP) or relatively small in size such as the Covered 
Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP). The PSPP constituted thus a radical change in the nature and scale 
of central bank asset purchases in the euro area. 
With standard operations the balance sheet of the Eurosystem is determined by the willingness of 
banks to borrow from it. For these borrowings the banks need collateral. A scarcity of collateral could 
thus limit the size of the balance sheet of the ECB and, at the same time, the ability of the banks to 
refinance at the ECB the financing they are providing for the real economy. A scarcity of collateral 
could thus impair the monetary transmission mechanism. 
However, it is highly unlikely that collateral will become so scarce that it constitutes a real limitation on 
the refinancing of banks or monetary policy in general. In purely quantitative terms, there exists a vast 
pool of unused potential collateral. At present, commercial banks have borrowed only 700 billion euro 
from the Eurosystem, mostly under longer-term operations, like the LTRO and the TLTRO. For this, 
about 1,500-billion-euro collateral has been pledged, a fraction of the total existing collateral of about 
14,000 billion euro. 
Collateral is a key ‘lubricant’ for financial markets in general. In many transactions, the parties use 
collateral to reduce counterparty risk. In the euro area, one must distinguish between two different 
aspects. 
• Banks need high quality collateral if they want to borrow from the Eurosystem in the context of its 
standard lending operations.  
• Many inter-bank and other financial transactions, such as repo operations and derivative 
transactions, involve the posting of collateral. 
In general, government bonds constitute the most important collateral, for use in inter-bank and repo 
transactions because they are liquid and have a transparent pricing. The vast bond-buying program of 
the Eurosystem within the context of the APP has reduced the amount of government bonds available 
on the market.  However, this has not led to any perceptible collateral scarcity. The Eurosystem has 
anyway bought less than one third of the total outstanding.  Morover, banks still hold very large 
amounts of sovereign bonds on their balance sheets and they have ample other collateral should they 
want to borrow from the Eurosystem for standard monetary policy operations. 
This contribution sets out the main parameters of the Eurosystem’s collateral policy, describes 
collateral availability and use. It also measures the impact of the Eurosystem’s bond buying on the 
availability of collateral in wider financial markets. 
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2. COLLATERAL IN ‘STANDARD’ MONETARY POLICY 
OPERATIONS 
Collateral provides protection for the central bank when lending to banks. This is especially important 
for the Eurosystem, for which ‘standard’ monetary policy operations consist mainly of collateralised 
lending to banks under its various types of operations (i.e. main refinancing operations and longer-
term refinancing operations).   
The availability of collateral is thus key for a smooth transmission mechanism of monetary policy. 
The ECB uses several mechanisms to protect itself against potential losses: i) restrictions on the type of 
collateral it accepts, including eligibility criteria with ratings thresholds (see Guideline ECB/2014/60), ii) 
haircuts, when it does not accept the collateral for its full value, and, iii) valuation standards. 
This implies that de facto the Eurosystem has a double protection against losses. First, the claim of the 
central bank is on the bank. Second, it has the collateral, which represents due to the valuation 
standards and haircuts a substantially higher value than the claim of the central bank on the bank. The 
collateral would only become relevant if the bank concerned became insolvent. 
In reality, the ECB accepts wide variety of marketable securities, which in some cases are low rated and 
foreign currency denominated. The securities have to be rated investment grade by at least one of four 
major ratings agencies. The official list shows about 30,000 different assets, which are accepted with 
an average haircut of about 10%. But the haircuts range between 0.5% for most short-term Euro-area 
central government bonds to up to 57% for long-term bonds issued by the Greek government1
Government bonds constitute of course the most important asset class available for collateral, 
amounting to slightly over one-half of the total. Covered bank bonds, corporate bonds, asset backed 
securities and other marketable assets form the other half. In total, the eligible marketable assets 
amount over 14 thousand billion euro, about 125 % of the euro area GDP (See Figure 1). 
. 
Additionally, banks can also present non-marketable securities as collateral such as large loans or 
mortgages, which they have securitized themselves. 
  
                                         
1  Eurosystem eligible assets as of 4 July 2018. 
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Figure 1: Marketable assets eligible as collateral (2004-2018Q1, EUR trillion) 
 
Note: Amounts represent the average nominal amount calibrated based on the averages of end of month data for each time-
period. 
Source ECB. 
 
However, government bonds do not constitute the most important element in the collateral actually 
used. Banks seem to prefer to use less liquid assets, such as credit claims or non-marketable assets 
(See Figure 2). This is not surprising: these less liquid assets can often not be used as collateral with 
other counterparties. It thus makes sense for the bank to use these less liquid assets for the credit 
obtained from the Eurosystem. As long as the haircuts are applied properly and valuations are 
sufficiently conservative the risk to the Eurosystem should be limited. With less liquid assets the 
Eurosystem might not be able to recover its claim quickly.  But this should not be a concern since 
liquidity is not a problem for a central bank. 
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Figure 2: Used collateral by type and credit provided (2004-2018Q1, EUR trillion) 
 
Note: Amounts represent the averages of end of month data for each time-period after valuation adjustments and haircuts. 
The distribution of non-marketable assets between credit claims and fixed-term and cash deposits is only available since 2013.  
Source: ECB. 
 
Figure 1 and 2 have a different scale and base. Notwithstanding the valuation adjustments and 
haircuts, the total marketable assets used as collateral as shown in Figure 2 is about 1,200 billion euro 
(total 1,600 billion), which is equivalent to 9% of the total amount of marketable assets theoretically 
available for collateral (see Figure 1). The right-hand panel also shows the total amount of outstanding 
credit (towards banks), which amounts to almost 800 billion euro. This implies that banks pledge 
collateral worth more than two times the amount they receive from the Eurosystem. But even with this 
security margin there does not seem to be prospect of a collateral scarcity for the ECB’s ‘standard’ 
operations any time soon. 
The comparison between the stock of ECB eligible assets and their effective use is, of course, 
misleading in that what matters for banks is not the total stock of government bonds in the hands of 
the public, but the bonds which the banks can effectively use, i.e. the ones they have on their balance 
sheet.  In these terms there seems be less of an abundance of collateral since banks hold ‘only’ about 
EUR 1.500 billion worth of general government bonds (out of the total of over EUR 7 billion shown in 
Figure 1). 
However, even on this basis, there seems to be no collateral scarcity since banks have used only about 
300 billion, or about 20 % of their government bond holdings as collateral with the ECB.  For other 
types of securities, the percentage used as collateral is much higher. There are no detailed statistics 
available, but the broad trend is clear. The aggregate balance sheet of the euro area banking system 
shows holdings of securities except government securities, at around 2.000 billion euro. The collateral 
use figures in Figure 2 imply that banks have used with the ECB collateral consisting of non-
governmental securities worth around EUR 1.000 billion (the sum of covered and uncovered bank 
bonds, corporate bonds, asset-backed securities and other marketable assets). This would indicate a 
collateral usage ratio of close to 50%.   
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3. COLLATERAL AND ‘NON STANDARD’ MONETARY POLICY 
OPERATIONS (QE) 
The non-standard operations of the Eurosystem are essentially the bond purchasing programmes. 
When the Eurosystem, usually through the NCBs and ECB, buys bonds it takes securities from the 
market, which could serve as collateral for other financial market transactions as well. 
Figure 3: Asset purchases under the Asset Purchase Programme (2014Q4-2018Q1, EUR 
trillion) 
 
Note: Amounts represent the averages of end of month-amortized costs for each time-period.  
Source: Author’s elaboration based on ECB. 
 
This has led to the question whether the APP and in particular the PSPP of the ECB could lead to 
collateral scarcity in financial markets in general, not only on banks’ balance sheets. This seems 
unlikely mainly because the Eurosystem holds only fraction of total (government bonds) outstanding. 
Even at end of the APP and PSPP, programmed for the end of 2018, the Eurosystem holdings of 
government (and supra-national) bonds will amount less than 20% of the total (See Figure 4). This is 
implicit already in the limitation, which the ECB has given itself, not to own more than the fraction of 
the total issue of any bonds, which would give it a blocking minority in any restructuring. 
  
0,0 
0,5 
1,0 
1,5 
2,0 
2,5 
Asset-backed securities (ABSPP) 
Corporate bonds (CSPP) 
Covered bonds (CBPP3) 
Government securities (PSPP) 
IPOL | Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies 
 
 12 PE 619.021 
Figure 4: Asset purchases and used collateral as share of eligible assets (2012-2018Q1) 
 
Note: The amounts used and total eligible assets constitute only marketable assets. The marketable assets account for 
approximately 75% of the total assets used as collateral. The asset purchases contain both the assets purchased under the 
APP and the SMP. The shares for 2018Q2 to Q4 are estimated assuming that the total eligible and used collateral will remain 
constant and the Eurosystem will conduct the asset purchases as announced. 
Source: ECB. 
 
Moreover, the available evidence indicates that bank holdings of government securities, those which 
banks could use to borrow more from the Eurosystem, have changed little. At the end of 2014 euro 
area MFI (Monetary Financial Institutions, ECB broad term for banks) held about EUR 1.800 billion in 
general government bonds. By June 2018 the figure had fallen to about EUR 1.500 billion, i.e. 300 
billion less (compared to Eurosystem purchases of over EUR 2.000 billion). 
To these considerations, one should add that the ECB had been aware of the potential of a collateral 
shortage and has created a securities lending program. This program is modest in size, but has been 
under-utilized in the past. Today the securities lending program is capped at EUR 75 billion, with an 
increasing amount being used (EUR 60 billion on average in May 2018). 
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
There seems to be no danger of collateral scarcity as a result of the non-standard operations of the 
ECB, like the APP and its main component PSPP. The government bonds bought by the Eurosystem 
are only to a very limited extend still available to market participants as collateral, but Eurosystem 
holdings amount only to about a fifth of government bonds. Government bonds constitute the 
collateral that is easiest to use, but the ECB accepts a wide variety of other assets as collateral. Euro 
area banks thus have many other sources they could mobilize if needed to obtain credit from the 
Eurosystem. The APP has thus immobilised only a low fraction of the total assets, which the ECB 
would accept as collateral for its own standard monetary policy operations. 
Banks have borrowed at present EUR 700 billion euro, for which they have posted about EUR 2,000 
billion in collateral, only a small fraction of the total of over EUR 14,000 billion of collateral acceptable 
by the ECB and also less than half of the eligible collateral which banks carry on their balance sheets. 
Moreover, the ECB also accepts non-marketable assets, such as loans which could alleviate any 
collateral scarcity. Finally, banks also hold at present around EUR 2,000 billion in deposits at the 
Eurosystem. There cannot be thus a great need for more liquidity in the banking system.  All in all, 
there is little reason to think that the bond buying has led a scarcity of collateral, which impair the 
smooth functioning of monetary policy. 
There is evidence that banks preferred to use less liquid, perhaps less easy to value, assets as collateral 
with the ECB. Hair-cuts and conservative valuations should limit the credit risk for the ECB. In the 
unlikely case a bank defaults, the losses for the ECB should then be limited. With less liquid assets, the 
ECB might not be able to realise their value quickly, but this should not be a cause of concern for a 
central bank which, by definition, does not have a liquidity problem. 
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Collateral constitutes an indispensable lubricant for the financial system. Government bonds 
constitute the most important source of collateral, for use in inter-bank and repo transactions. But 
the vast bond buying program of the ECB (PSPP, APP) has not led to any collateral scarcity. Banks 
still hold very large amounts of sovereign bonds and they have ample other collateral should they 
want to borrow more from the ECB (i.e. for ‘standard’ monetary policy operations). 
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